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1. Introduction
The launch of EMU, which is expected to represent a
source of benefits for European economies facing recovery
after years of slowdown, to some extent implies the end
of national fiscal policies. A key-element of EMU will in
fact lie in the disciplined and coordinated fiscal policies
of all its participants. If we take a look at the years
following the 1990-91 supply-side shock and the 1992
currency crisis, we see that fiscal policies in Member
States have been restricted both according to the criteria
stated by the Maastricht Treaty and due to the levels of
deficit inherited from the past and the consequent need to
reduce them.
Budget deficits under EMU will have to decrease
further than they already have been and with the acceptance
of the even stricter provisions contained in the Stability
and Growth Pact possibly tend to zero (the Maastricht
Treaty itself only requires a deficit of not more than 3%
of GDP) in order to maintain convergence in the long run,
although, as we will see, there are no effective sanctions
if a Member State fails to meet the target once EMU has
started. In fact, in principle, interest rates should not be
pushed upwards by any deficit-prone or inflationary
policy. In addition, the end of the exchange rate regime in
the EU means that weaker economies will no longer be
allowed to devalue their currencies in order to limit the
impact of asymmetric shocks.1
The main purpose of this paper is to consider whether
fiscal policy according to EMU’s constraints is sustainable
particularly in the context of high unemployment and low
growth. In this respect, this paper is mainly based on
previous studies which developed possible scenarios in
order to examine this sustainability. The paper also
considers the implications of the sanctions stated in the
Stability and Growth Pact on EMU Member States’
economies should they actually be applied. In this respect,
a negative economic scenario characterised by asymmetric
shocks is presented in order to try to establish whether the
EMU provides measures which may help economic
recovery by enhancing regional convergence. A
comparison with US fiscal federalism is also made to
compare the means used in the US to achieve stabilisation.
Finally, the discussion is extended by considering whether
fiscal policies in a Monetary Union should in principle
incorporate stabilising functions, and whether a Monetary
Union actually needs a centralised fiscal policy in order
to pursue such stabilisation.
2. EMU’s Fiscal Policy constraints and its effects on
national policies
According to the Commission’s forecasts,2 the benefits
of EMU should mainly consist of: 1) reduced budget
deficits and coordinated fiscal policies; 2) lowered costs
for businesses, price transparency and lower prices for
consumers; 3) monetary stability due to the absence of
exchange rate fluctuations; 4) the creation of a euro-area
capable of attracting investors thanks to a stable level of
interest rates. The sustainability of EMU itself, however,
lies in economic recovery being maintained in the long
term and no Member State being forced to pursue goals
which are not stated in the Treaty on European Union and
in the Stability and Growth Pact. The criteria should in
fact be sustained at a desirable level in the long run, which
would certainly be easier if there were no economic
downturns.
Let us now see what has been the main implication of
convergence criteria towards EMU with respect to fiscal
policy. Since the Maastricht Treaty imposes low budget
deficits – that is deficits which do not amount to more
than 3% of GDP – in order to keep interest rates low, some
inflation-prone and less disciplined countries – such as
Italy, and Spain, which suffered considerably from the
1992-95 slowdown – have found it difficult to satisfy this
criteria because they are facing economic recession.
Though it is also very easy to say these Member States
have had more disciplined fiscal policies because they are
now subject to the Maastricht criteria, it is also true that
the huge amount of public debts they inherited from the
past also made it necessary for them to reduce their
deficits and to correct the trends in their public finances.
While these economies have succeeded in satisfying
the criteria their unemployment levels have generally
risen, as has the average EU unemployment rate when
compared to the US rate.3 Therefore, during the
convergence process towards the so-called Maastricht
criteria, restrictive fiscal policies may have contributed to
a further rise in unemployment, beyond that caused by the
economic downturn in these countries alone. Summing
up, since EMU will imply the maintenance of tight fiscal
policies, the question whether such policies will help
economic recovery remains open.
In examining how fiscal policy should be conducted
under EMU according to the spirit of the Treaty one can
see, firstly, that the rules of fiscal policy as proposed by
the Treaty of Maastricht contain explicit rules on the
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public finances of the individual Member States of the
EU as a necessary condition for the entry in EMU.4
Secondly, after entry, Member States must retain fiscal
flexibility for stabilisation purposes, but as public debt
monetisation is forbidden,5 they should avoid excessive
deficits which may lead to an unsustainable fiscal position.
Countries running excessive deficits have to correct their
position otherwise they are subject to penalties and fines.
In this respect, the Treaty of Maastricht suffers from a
remarkable weakness, that is it lacks provisions for the
creation of a strong federal institution to help Member
States conduct national fiscal policies. The Stability and
Growth Pact, agreed at the European Council in Dublin
on 13 December 1996, provides guidelines for Member
States’ governments with respect to fiscal policy. It
imposes sanctions on those states which have transgressed
budgetary discipline (by having a deficit of more than 3%
of GDP) – we will not focus on the exceptions which will
allow a Member State to avoid such sanctions. What is
important to emphasise is that it seems that while some
measures aimed at the enforcement of budgetary discipline
exist, any measure to help a State towards a recovery is
apparently missing. Broadly speaking, according to the
spirit of the Stability and Growth Pact it may seem that if
a Member State in economic downturn loses control of its
deficit it is punished, rather than given support to improve
its economy.6
During the Third phase of EMU, when the conduct of
monetary policy is centralised at the European level and,
therefore no longer available as a policy tool at the
national level, budgetary policy will be the main
macroeconomic policy instrument available for individual
Member States in order to limit the impact of recessions,
especially as a result of asymmetric shocks. In such a
context due to the impossibility of lowering interest rates
and resorting to currency devaluation larger deficit changes
might be required. However, according to the Mundell-
Fleming model,7 in the new policy environment of EMU,
budgetary policies will in principle become more effective
in softening the impact of cyclical fluctuations with
centralised monetary policy and irrevocably fixed
exchange rates between Member States. However, unless
national policies are coordinated, these budgetary policies
will increase the changes in the budget deficit required in
order to obtain the same degree of stabilisation achieved
in the past.
The actual deficit changes which took place during
past severe recessions, such as that of 1992-95, usually
started from markedly higher pre-recession deficit levels.
The impact on the economy of budgetary policy changes
during recession under EMU should, however, be different
from that of a rise in a deficit from, let us say, 8% to 10%
of GDP, which may have been seen in the past. This is
because at higher rates the deficit is more likely to shift on
to an unsustainable path, as such fiscal expansion generally
leads to an increase in the risk premium on interest rates,
in order to avoid inflation.
In the flexible exchange rate regime Member States
facing recession were able to improve their situations by
increasing their competitiveness and by lowering wages,
social security transfers and taxation levels. However,
such advantages often vanished because of the volatility
of the exchange rates regime. With the EMU and the
single currency, things change. Variations in labour costs,
or labour law, as well as the level of skill and mobility of
the labour force become key-factors once the exchange
rate advantage disappears, especially in case of economic
downturns. Therefore, a stricter fiscal policy will affect
the competitiveness of firms but other microeconomic
policies – affecting labour market flexibility and taxation
level – will also play a predominant role.
In short, after the launch of EMU, fiscal and monetary
policy will run according both to the Stability and Growth
Pact and to the provisions stated in the Maastricht Treaty
(no fiscal solidarity, no monetisation of public debt).
However, no form of coordination of fiscal policies
among Member States has been conceived of so far, and
it is possible to predict that there may be fiscal policies in
some EMU countries which will be run in a different way
from that stated in the Treaty. In these cases, the sanctions
stated by the Stability and Growth Pact could be applied.
However, the most apparent lack of form of
coordination regards fiscal policy. If there is a common
monetary policy, that is the European Central Bank
(ECB) fixing short-term interest rates to have an anti-
inflationary effect, other economic policies (such as
taxation level, social security, labour cost and labour
mobility) will still depend on each government’s policies,
and all governments will run their own national policies
according to their domestic priorities, but not necessarily
with a significant degree of coordination.
3. Are there alternatives to fiscal federalism?
Let us now draw a scenario, where an asymmetric shock
affects EU economies and deepens regional disparities in
terms of output, growth level, income and employment
levels. We have seen that when a country joins EMU it
loses its ability to use monetary and exchange rate policy
in order to stabilise its economy. In the case of a shock
affecting Italy, for instance, with flexible exchange rates
the Lira would depreciate, and the resulting real
depreciation would raise export demand and help the
Italian economy recover. This is not the case with EMU.
Moreover, adjustments are unlikely to come about through
migration for, while the free movement of labour is a
theoretical reality within the EU, migration is still difficult
because of language and cultural differences. Indeed it
may even be considered politically unacceptable as a
mean of making adjustments. Doyle, at the time when the
Delors Report was launched,8 found that this leaves EU’s
fiscal policy as the main mechanism for absorbing such
shocks.9
The question is whether there is a net transfer system
according to EMU provisions. In case of a country-
specific recession due to an asymmetric shock, the
institutional framework of EMU does not provide for
forms of cooperation. The Cohesion Fund, which we may
compare to US federal taxes in this case, amount to less
than 1.5% of EU’s GDP. According to the US pattern, a
region which is hit by a shock could benefit from a
minimum fiscal transfer through the form of a smaller
contribution to the EU’s budget, as in the US where a34
State in economic downturn in effect pays less taxes
through the receipt of social transfers which are financed
by the other States. Examples of fiscal flows in the US
and Canada show that there is no fiscal federalism in the
context of EMU where, in comparison, the budget is
small and redistribution is limited. However, single
governments can still carry out stabilisation policies
using domestic fiscal instruments to an extent which is
comparable to that of the US and Canada.
These considerations arise from the question of
whether economies in a downturn (as in the case of
asymmetric shocks, which are often country-specific)
could be better stabilised by a federal-type of fiscal
solidarity or by the simple respect of fiscal policy rules
implemented at the national level by each EMU Member
State.
When considering to what extent the US and Canada
can be used as a reference point for the EU Bayoumi and
Masson10 drew the following three conclusions:
a) The size of the federal flows varies significantly
depending on the institutional structure of the country
concerned, so that neither the US nor Canada provide
a benchmark for EMU.
b) The stabilisation which is performed by national
governments in the EU is comparable to that which
occurs in the US or Canadian federal fiscal systems at
the national level. Therefore, there does not seem to
be a case for a federal system among EU countries on
stabilisation grounds at the federal/European level,
unless increasing integration limits their ability to
carry out stabilisation policies in the framework of
EMU. (This, however, is supposed to be the case).
c) Both federations, the US and Canada, have remarkable
redistributive functions. Even in the case of US,
where there is no specific requirement for the federal
government to pursue a policy of equality in income
level, the federal fiscal system reduces long-term
income differentials by 22 cents in a dollar. On the
other hand, according to Bayoumi and Masson, the
EU Structural and Cohesion Funds, which amount to
0.45% of the EU’s GDP and do not have stabilising
functions nor aim at redistributing wealth and
equalising incomes, would not be sufficient to pursue
such goals. In contrast to the US and Canada, the lack
of an adequate fiscal instrument would expose the EU
to regional economic disparities unrelated to the
underlying trends of regional development, causing
strain and dissatisfaction with the EMU and
undermining its proper functioning, which would
have particular consequences on unemployment
levels. Sachs and Sala-i-Martin pointed to the US
experience to enforce this view.11
They contend that the US federal fiscal system
responds to regional shocks by offsetting about one-third
of the effect of the impact through tax and transfer
payments and lower federal taxes. Their conclusion is
that an EMU without a sufficiently large fiscal apparatus
would produce a detrimental impact, at least, in terms of
sustainability. Von Hagen, however, shows that the
estimates presented in Sachs and Sala-i-Martin are biased
upward, because they do not separate transitory from
permanent"regional shocks.12 This distinction is clear in
the empirical evidence, which shows that the US fiscal
system offsets only around 10% of a transitory regional
shock, a finding which is confirmed by Atkeson and
Bayoumi.13 Masson and Taylor present evidence for
Canada showing the similar, relatively small role of the
federal fiscal system in dealing with regional shocks.14
More generally, the question of whether the lack of an
apparent fiscal integration in EMU would be offset
according to US and Canadian patterns still remains
unanswered, and the literature cannot reach an unanimous
conclusion about how to settle it.
Is there really an alternative to fiscal federalism for
EMU then? Looking back over the years, the call for a
sizeable centralised fiscal budget goes back to the era of
the McDougall Report of 1977, which estimated that a
budget of about 5% of the Community’s GDP would be
required for a viable EMU.15 The Delors Report judged
that a central bank budget of that size would not be
politically feasible in the near future and therefore called
for the greater coordination of fiscal policies among the
members to achieve the same purpose.
What form then should such net transfers assume?
The McDougall Report and the Delors Report, which
were mainly concerned with the problem of reducing
disparities in per capita income through equalising and
stabilising mechanisms, pointed to using public finances
in unitary and federal states. This appears to be the
approach also advocated and employed by the EU.
Fiscal policy under EMU should therefore involve
net fiscal transfers to countries under recession, in order
to stabilise rather than to redistribute wealth. Such transfers
should also include a certain proportion of funds devoted
specifically to the process of structural adjustment: a
concept which already exists in EMU, especially in the
context of regional policies as well as the structural
elements of the functional policies. In addition to helping
reduce disparities in the growth rate in per capita income,
such an approach to net regional transfers would give
birth to self-sustaining growth, reducing and eliminating
the need for such net transfers in the long term.
The McDougall Report of 1977 showed that within
both the unitary and federal states up to 40 per cent of
regional disparities in per capita income are eliminated
by fiscal transfers. Nevertheless, according to the
McDougall Report the main purpose of the stabilisation
policy would be to stabilise incomes, rather than to
redistribute wealth. In combination with national
provisions such as unemployment benefit, the tax system
would execute automatic transfers among regions, without
requiring any appropriation and spending authority at the
EU level of coordination of national spending policies,
that is without fiscal policies. From a politicoeconomic
point of view, however, there are two alternatives which
are not equally desirable. Firstly, increasing the EU
budget would mean increasing the power of central
administration both in comparison to Member States’
governments and to ECB. Secondly, a federal tax system
with redistributive functions, in contrast, would not make
the actual transfers subject to political discussion at the35
national level. The theory of fiscal federalism suggests, in
fact, that national administrations would recognise the
priorities and needs of the individual Member States
better, especially in case of an economic downturn16
requiring more expansionary national fiscal policies.
The whole matter clearly implies a political choice as
to how much redistribution should occur across countries,
rather than a choice based on economic necessity related
to Monetary Union. Such choice depends on the pressures
of public opinions and speculation about this is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, political pressures for
such redistribution may grow in the EU in response to
other forces for increased integration, in particular the
Single Market and the EMU itself. As a matter of fact, a
political discussion has already taken place in the EU
Member States in order to clarify what will become of the
savings coming from the reduction in interest rates, and
whether the ECB will be enabled to use these resources
and how. However, this involves the role and the tasks of
the ECB and does not affect the question whether fiscal
policy in EMU can actually play a decisive role – at a state
or federal level – in softening the impact of recessions and
asymmetric shocks. It appears clear that any fiscal
federalism on the US or the Canadian pattern would mean
a further loss of national sovereignty in fiscal matters,
which would probably seem a too great a step towards
federal economic integration in the framework of a non-
federal political integration process.
4. Does a centralised fiscal policy matter in the EMU?
The orthodox Mundell-Fleming model of 1961 suggested
that in the context of a monetary union the domestic
effectiveness of fiscal policy would be enhanced17 by
autonomous fiscal policies. But given that fiscal policy
intervention is perceived to be desirable and feasible in
national terms, how autonomous can national fiscal
policies be in a Monetary Union? The basic issue is
whether market forces rely on Monetary Union to effect
the necessary consistency between national fiscal policies
and the common monetary policy of the EU, or whether
some forms of coordination of national fiscal policies by
the community are also required.
Whether in a monetary union national fiscal polices
should be flexible and autonomous is now considered. If
countries are hit by adverse country-specific shocks that
the Union’s monetary policy cannot address, and if the
lack of fiscal integration rules out any automatic transfer
through the Community budget for stabilisation purposes,
Member States must be able to respond by incurring a
budget deficit if the Union is not to be subjected to
intolerable stresses.18 Such deficits would automatically
arise as tax revenues decline and social expenditures
increase in order to soften the social impact of the shock
– loss of jobs, etc. – and their magnitude could be
increased by discretionary fiscal changes.
It should also be noted that, as Robson suggested,19
achieving an optimal level of stabilisation does not
necessarily require the centralisation of the stabilisation
functions.
In principle, the problems could be addressed through
policy coordination interventions of Member States.
Policy coordination faces other difficulties, however, not
least of which is that, even if it is based upon rules and
even more so if it is discretionary, it requires continual
intra-community negotiation, which takes time.
Fiscal discipline has also to do with the avoidance of
unsustainable public debt. If a Member State runs a
deficit and incurs public debt over a period and at a rate
that threatens its capacity to service that debt, the debt is
ultimately unsustainable. The incentives to engage in
deficit financing will certainly be modified in various
ways by the institution of Monetary Union.20 It is therefore
conceivable that the incentives to fiscal discipline may be
reduced. One important reason for supposing this to be
true is that the sanction of exchange rate depreciation
against imprudent national policies will be lacking in
Monetary Union.
Nevertheless, decisions have to be made on the means
to be adopted to protect the Monetary Union and the
financial system from the effects of excessive deficits of
Member States. The choice seems to lie between the
imposition of rigid ex ante limits on deficits and debt,
which may hinder sustainable deficits, on the one hand,
and some more flexible forms of fiscal surveillance that
would be more clearly defensible in terms of national
economic situations and community policy objectives on
the other. The Stability and Growth Pact seems to solve
the dilemma in favour of the first hypothesis, which
means that although Member States do not lose any
sovereignty as regards fiscal policy their room for
manoeuvring in case of recessions is considerably reduced.
With respect to coordination between fiscal and
monetary policy, the Commission has often suggested in
the past a US-like policy mix, that is a combination of
expansionary monetary policy and tightened fiscal policy,
which is actually the opposite of what was pursued in the
late 1980s and also throughout the first half of 1990s by
most Member States, as reported by Buti, Franco and
Ongena.21
The experience of large budget deficits in 1980s and
early 1990s and the efforts made by EU Member States
to restrain debt incurred due to fiscal policies in the 1980s
have caused a delay in convergence which almost
jeopardised the start of the third phase of the EMU. The
additional borrowing which is needed to pay the interest
on existing debt in some Member States could still create
problems for sustainability – in terms of fiscal policy –
even after the final entry into the third phase. If such a
condition – that is the upward limit public debt – is
violated, and the public debt in an EMU country keeps on
growing, budgetary policies would then have to be changed
and may have to be supported by the sale of public assets
which could also negatively affect the country’s foreign
exchange reserves. This is why the Treaty prevents the
Member States from running excessive deficits. Therefore,
the evidence does not support the theory of Mundell’s
optimum currency areas that national fiscal policies can
create deficits to absorb the negative effects of shocks
without problems of sustainability. Thus, the main
problem is how to establish rules for budgetary stability
in the long run for members of the EMU, and the
abovementioned consideration justifies the provisions36
regarding the rules for fiscal policy which are contained
in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth
Pact.
Besides, two other important implications of
undertaking direct fiscal action for stabilisation purposes
through the budget of an economic community may be
underlined. First, asymmetric shocks can be expected to
diminish in relative importance if economies converge in
their structures as a result of integration. Secondly, if
direct fiscal interventions for stabilisation at community
level were to be limited to providing assistance to Member
States, the whole budgetary cost of stabilisation would be
substantially reduced.
5. Concluding remarks
The achievement of a reduction of regional disparities in
output and unemployment levels should be seen as a
long-term goal. Those who conceived the EMU knew
that, with respect to fiscal policy, a positive scenario with
low interest rates, no shocks and sustained growth would
allow a tightened fiscal policy to be sustainable in the
context of a Monetary Union. Yet, the EMU is made up
by asymmetric economies, whose low degree of
integration in microeconomic issues – mainly labour
market flexibility and taxation level – is one of the main
reasons why such economies are affected to a different
degree by economic shocks. However, the membership
of the EMU should protect weaker economies from such
shocks, such as the crisis of 1992-93, and their impacts
which are immediately reflected in prices, inflation rate
and on interest rates.
The conclusion emerging is that the creation of the
EMU will be associated with national government having
a smaller scope in fiscal policies, thus indirectly
contributing to greater fiscal discipline among the
participating states. Yet, the Treaty does not provide for
any significant centralisation of the national government
budgets in the EMU. This implies that there will not be
any explicit automatic transfer mechanism which
redistributes income, thereby softening the social
consequences for the Member States hit by asymmetric
demand shocks. Under these conditions, the national
governments are likely to push for higher transfer
payments from the budget of the EU through negotiation.
The main consequence would be that, in case of
asymmetric shocks, a tightened fiscal policy (which
allows low deficits and low long-term interest rates) and
a lax monetary policy (which leads to low short-term
interest rates) could be barely sustainable in the long-
term. Therefore, a common fiscal policy from the countries
participating to the EMU would not itself be sustainable
and, even if it were sustainable, it would be insufficient
and not appropriate for every country. In this perspective,
a long-lasting growth appears to be the only real condition
not only to reduce gaps in economic performances and to
lower unemployment rates, but also to avoid the whole
EMU being put under pressure. In case of an asymmetric
shock, the lack of a fiscal federalism may cast a shadow
of uncertainty on the forthcoming EMU.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article porte essentiellement sur la politique fiscale
après le lancement de la troisième phase de l’Union
économique et monétaire (UEM) et sur le caractère
soutenable de l’UEM dans le contexte de taux de chômage
élevés et de croissance faible. A ce sujet, on peut se
demander quel sera l’impact des sanctions stipulées
dans le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance et si l’UEM
prévoit des mesures destinées à contribuer à la relance
en cas de chocs asymétriques.
En premier lieu, les politiques fiscales seront
resserrées comme ce fut le cas lors des récessions de
1992-95, compte tenu des règles stipulées dans le Traité
de Maastricht et dans le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance
(faibles déficits budgétaires, pas de monétisation de la
dette publique). En fait, s’il y a une politique monétaire
commune assurée par la Banque centrale européenne
(BCE), qui fixe les taux d’intérêt à court terme dans une
perspective anti-inflationniste, d’autres politiques
économiques, y compris la politique fiscale, sont conduites
au niveau national, de sorte que les gouvernements
nationaux définiront probablement ces politiques selon
leurs priorités internes, mais pas nécessairement avec un
degré élevé de coordination.
Même si les politiques fiscale et monétaire seront
menées suivant les dispositions stipulées dans le Pacte de
stabilité et de croissance et le Traité de Maastricht,
aucune forme de coordination entre les politiques fiscales
des Etats membres n’a été conçue jusqu’ici, et l’on peut
facilement prédire que les politiques fiscales dans certains
Etats membres seront conduites autrement que ne le
stipule le Traité. Contrairement aux Etats-Unis et au
Canada, l’UEM ne prévoit aucune disposition concernant
la solidarité fiscale au-delà du respect de ses règles
relatives à la politique fiscale. Par ailleurs, on ne trouve
jusqu’ici aucune réponse unanime dans la littérature
économique à la question de savoir si le fédéralisme
fiscal à l’américaine permettrait de mieux assurer une
stabilisation. Il faut savoir que le thème du fédéralisme
fiscal dans le cadre d’une future Union monétaire en
Europe a fait son apparition pour la première fois dans
l’agenda européen grâce au rapport Mc Dougall en
1977. Tout cela implique en fait un choix politique : si
cela devait aboutir à un fédéralisme fiscal basé sur le
modèle américain ou canadien, ce choix impliquerait
une perte supplémentaire de la souveraineté nationale en
matière fiscale et un trop grand pas vers l’intégration
économique fédérale dans le cadre d’un processus
d’intégration politique non fédéral.
La question du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance
répond à la nécessité d’imposer des limites rigides ex-
ante au déficit et à la dette, ce qui signifie que bien que les
Etats membres ne perdent pas leur souveraineté en
matière de politique fiscale, leur marge de manoeuvre en
cas de récession est considérablement réduite. Le
principal problème consiste à savoir comment établir
des règles pour assurer une stabilité budgétaire à long
terme aux membres de l’UEM. La Commission a suggéré
dans le passé une sorte de mix de politiques, c’est-à-dire
une combinaison d’une politique fiscale renforcée et37
d’une politique monétaire expansionniste.
La principale conclusion que l’on peut tirer est que la
création de l’UEM sera associée à la portée plus limitée
des politiques fiscales des gouvernements nationaux,
créant ainsi une plus grande discipline fiscale parmi les
pays participants. Or, le Traité ne prévoit pas de
centralisation importante des budgets nationaux dans
l’UEM, ce qui implique qu’il n’y aura pas de mécanisme
de transfert automatique de la solidarité fiscale qui
redistribue les revenus, allégeant ainsi les effets sociaux
sur les Etats membres frappés par les chocs asymétriques.
Toutefois, l’une des conséquences négatives pourrait
être qu’en cas de chocs asymétriques, le mix de politiques
susmentionné serait difficilement soutenable à long terme
et finirait même par mettre en péril le caractère durable
de l’UEM dans son ensemble. On peut donc s’attendre à
ce que les chocs asymétriques perdent de leur importance
si l’intégration micro-économique entraîne une
convergence des structures économiques.
________________
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